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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
CASE COMMENTS
Agency-Recovery in Tort Under the Theory of Apparent
Authority or Agency by Estoppel
P, a minor, was injured in a fall from a horse as a result of the
negligence of K, a riding instructor. The injury occurred on Ds'
land, where riding lessons had been given for several years. Ds,
husband and wife, provided the riding ring and horses for the
lessons and their name with the words "Riding School" were painted
on their truck and trailer and on a sign hanging near their home.
K roomed and boarded at Ds' home, but he kept all money received
from his instruction. P and her mother believed that the riding
school was run by Ds and that K was Ds' employee. After jury
verdicts for P against Ds, the trial court transferred the question
raised by Ds' motions for nonsuits and directed verdicts whether
there was sufficient evidence to support the verdicts. Held,
judgment on the verdicts for P. When a person is injured by the
negligence of one whom the injured party could reasonably have
believed was acting on behalf of a third person and when the
injured party did in fact rely on this belief, the negligence of the
party causing the injury may be imputed to the third party on the
theory of "apparent authority" without proof of an actual agency
relationship. Christian v. Elden, 221 A.2d 784 (N.H. 1966).
Recovery in the New Hampshire decision was based on "apparent
authority", but the doctrine adopted by perhaps the majority of
courts granting relief in similar situations has been that of "agency
by estopper. The decision thus raises the question whether there
is, or should be, a distinction made between the two concepts.
Both apparent authority and agency by estoppel operate to make
a principal liable for the acts of another whom the principal has
led a third party to believe is acting in his behalf; the other party
may or may not be his agent.' In both there must be a representa-
tion or manifestation springing from the principal to the third
' Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Steckel, 216 Iowa 1189, 250 N.W.
476 (1933); Great Am. Cas. Co. v. Eichelberger, 37 S.W.2d 1050 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931). Real authority, either express or implied in fact, is not dis-
cussed in this comment. Although the facts in the principal case suggest
the existence of a real agency, the issue on appeal assumed its absence.
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party, and not from the agent alone.2 Moreover, under each theory
it is necessary that the third party have actually relied on the action
or omissions of the principal-a subjective test 3-and that a reason-
ably prudent man under the same circumstances would have been
misled and have relied on the principal's manifestations-an objec-
tive test.4 Despite these similarities, some authority, including the
Restatement (Second), Agency,5 views apparent authority and
agency by estoppel as distinct concepts. An additional element, it
is argued, is required for estoppel-detrimental change of position
by the third party.6 Under the estoppel doctrine the burden of
loss is placed on the party who, although innocent, created the
circumstances that made the loss possible. Therefore, a principal,
whose conduct creates the appearance of authority on which the
third party relied to his detriment, is estopped to deny its existence.
Whereas the emphasis of apparent authority is on power to bind the
principal, the emphasis of estoppel is to forbid the principal to deny
the authority which has caused a loss."
The rationale underlying the Restatement view is in the historical
bases of the doctrines. Apparent authority is based on contract;
estoppel has a tort base. Under the objective theory of contract,
one is bound by his outward expressions and manifestations. Thus,
it is consistent to hold that a principal has become a contracting
party to a bona fide contract when his outward expressions can
reasonably be interpreted as vesting authority in his apparent agent,
whether he intended to do so or not. Under apparent authority,
it is also consistent to provide a mutuality of remedies; the
principal has the right to hold a third party to this real contract
2 Berryhill v. Ellet, 64 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1953) (apparent authority);
Manning v. Leavitt Co., 90 N.H. 167, 5 A.2d 667 (1939) (agency by
estoppel); see Springer v. Heath Motor Co., 261 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953); Raftis v. McCloud River Lumber Co., 35 Cal. App. 397, 170 Pac. 176
(1917).
3 Berryhill v. Ellet, supra note 2 (apparent authority); Manning v. Leavitt
Co., supra note 2 (agency by estoppel).
4 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Lougee, 89 N.H. 222, 196 At. 267
(1938).
5 RESTATEmNT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 8, Reporter's Notes (1958).6 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 8, comment d (1958); Manning
v. Leavitt Co., 90 N.H. 167, 5 A.2d 667 (1939); rsTATEMENT (SEcoND),
AGENCY; 58, comment d (1958); see Reo Motor Co. v. Barnes, 9 S.W.2d 374
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (applying estoppel, one of reasons for denying recovery
was no change of position).
7 See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. King Lumber Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 17, 113
P.2d 483 (1941); Kanelles v. Locke, 12 Ohio App. 210 (1919); Reserve Ins.
Co. v. Duckett, 240 Md. 591, 214 A.2d 754 (1965).
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without ratifying or assenting to his agent's acts. However, under
the tort theory of estoppel, the purpose is to prevent loss by
compensating innocent parties who have been injured by reliance
on the principal's manifestations. No real contract may be formed,
but the third party is allowed to hold the principal to the truth of
the facts manifested as true. As a result, there is no mutuality of
remedies in estoppel.8
Notwithstanding the Restatement view, in cases involving re-
covery on contracts, the courts have applied the two theories in
a manner which indicates that the principles of apparent authority
and estoppel are elements of a single concept by which the principal
is bound. Many opinions state the right of the third party to hold
the principal to the full extent of the apparent authority is acquired
through the fact of estoppel.9 The court in Manley v. MacFarland0
stated that "the theory of estoppel, since it is essentially similar to
that of apparent authority, may be applied in establishing apparent
authority."" The courts apply both doctrines for the ultimate
purpose of holding the principal bound, "in which case the elements
of apparent authority and estoppel are the fact upon which they
are based, and the results achieved are the same."' 2 A recent
Maryland case 3 used strong language in holding the two concepts
to be identical:
Although the cases and texts refer both to "apparent authority"
and "agency by estoppel" there seems to be no clear line of
demarcation. Each results from certain acts or manifestations
by the alleged principal made to third parties. It must be
reasonable for the third person dealing with the alleged event
to believe that the agent had authority to act. The third person
must in fact believe that the alleged agent has such authority,
i.e., he must rely on such acts or manifestations."'
8 REsTATEmmN (SEco-D), AcGcy § 8, comment d (1958).
9 Berryhill v. Ellet, 64 F.2d 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Reo Motor Co. v.
v. Eichelberger, 37 S.W.2d 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Reo Motor Co. v.
Barnes, 9 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Livingston v. Fuhrman, 37
A.2d 747 (D.C. Mun. App. 1944).
10 80 Idaho 312, 327 P.2d 758 (1958).
11 Id. at 323, 327 P.2d at 764.
12ibid.
13 Reserve Ins. Co. v. Dukett, 240 Md. 591, 214 A.2d 754(1965).
14 Id. at 600, 214 A.2d at 759.
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Although using estoppel language, these cases do not appear to
require a change of position by the relying party, the necessary
element for estoppel, according to the Restatement. Seavey argues
that merely making a contract is not a sufficient change of position
for estoppel to apply, and that where the third party has done no
more, the correct theory of recovery is apparent authority, not
estoppel. He argues that if estoppel is viewed as part of apparent
authority, not only would a change of position be required to bind
the principal, but the principal would be able to hold the third
party only if he ratified the transaction."5
The New Hampshire decision involved recovery in tort for
personal injuries. The facts reveal no real agency or employment,
but its appearance was manifested by the defendant to the plaintiff
who suffered a loss. The case falls directly within the scope of
section 267 of the Restatement (Second), Agency, which states
that "one who represents that another is his servant or other agent
and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care
or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third
person for harm caused by the lack of skill or the one appearing
to be a servant or other agent as if he were such."1 6 Besides calling
this relationship apparent authority, as in the principal case, the
courts also have termed it "agency by estoppel"," 7 "apparent
agency", 8 and "apparent employment"." Despite the difference
in terminology, the defendant is consistently held liable when the
requisite elements are proven. Perhaps the terminology most
frequently used is estoppel. Cases basing liability in tort on the
estoppel theory, where the fact situations are similar to that of the
principal case, include: a store permitting advertisement to the
effect that a particular business was carried on as part of the
operation of the store, when it was in fact carried on as a separate
15 SAvm, AcmNcy § 8E, at 14-15 (1964). Contra, MEcmm, AGENCY §§
87-88 (4th ed. 1952). An unauthorized act is ratified when a party, having
notice of all the material facts confirms or approves the act. Ratification of
the previously unauthorized act results in the creation of an agency relation-
ship, and the rights and duties of the principal are the same as if the act had
been carried out under prior authority. Fox v. Morse, 255 Minn. 318, 96
N.W.2d 637 (1959).1 6RTAEF;N (SEcoND), AGENCY § 267 (1958).17 Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 138 Ohio St. 178, 34 N.E.2d 202
(1941); Manning v. Leavitt Co., 90 N.H. 167, 5 A.2d 667 (1939).
18Getlar v. Rubinstein, 171 Misc. 40, 11 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
19 FmsoN, AGENcy § 54 (1954).
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business operation, leasing one floor of the store;2" a market
advertising to the public that a product was for sale at the market,
when it actually was for sale from a counter leased to another;2 '
owner defendant cab company granting possession of a cab with
colors and name of the cab company upon it to an independent
operator who was subsequently negligent;22 and defendant hotel
owner permitting one to appear as a clerk with authority to collect
valuables for safekeeping. 3
There are but a few cases applying apparent authority to the
type of situation present in the principal case. In Livingston v.
Fuhrman," the court held the defendant liable, where he allowed
one L to use his jewelry store to operate an independent retail
jewelery business. Plaintiff relied on the representation of the fact
that L was an employee of defendant. The court found the de-
fendant had clothed L with apparent authority to act as agent
and that the plaintiff had assumed she was dealing with the
defendant through his agent L. The defendant was held liable
on the basis of apparent authority and no estoppel was mentioned.
However, the case may be distinguished from the cases applying
estoppel, since it was an action for breach of warranty, an action
arising out of contract, rather than a tort action for damages. As
was seen earlier, apparent authority is generally associated with
contract law.
Other distinctions are suggested by the cases and authorities in
the application of the two theories. In the definitions set forth,
there seems to be an assumption of an already existing agency25
that normally, though not necessarily, stems from a prior relation-
ship of principal and agent. 6 The apparent authority is separate
from the existing authority, and as such may be greater than, equal
to, or less than the actual authority.27 The cases discussing estoppel
2° Manning v. Leavitt Co., 90 N.H. 167, 5 A.2d 667 (1939); Hannon v.
Seigle-Cooper Co., 167 N.Y. 244, 60 N.E. 597 (1901); Santise v. Martins, Inc.,
17 N.Y.S.2d 741 (App. Div. 1940); Annot., 122 A.L.R. 249 (1939).
21 Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 138 Ohio St. 178, 34 N.E.2d 202
(1 IMarcbette v. Olyowski, 181 F.2d 285 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Rhone v. Try
Me Cab Co. 62 App. D.C. 201, 65 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
23Kanelfes v. Locke, 12 Ohio App. 210 (1919).
2437 A.2d 747 (D.C. Mun. App. 1944).
25 Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Steckel, 216 Iowa 1189, 250 N.W.
476 (1933); Great Am. Cas. Co. v. Eichelberger, 37 S.W.2d 1050 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931); Bank of Morgantown v. Hay, 143 N.C. 326, 55 S.E. 811
(1906); White Lake Lumber Co. v. Stone 19 Neb 402, 27 N.W. 345 (1886).2 6
ESTATEmENT (SEcoND), AcaENcy 8, comment a (1958).
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are in line with this proposition since most are situations where
there is no pre-existing agency relationship." These cases suggest,
as does Seavey,29 that where one makes no affirmative representa-
tion of agency, but his wrong is his failure "to tell persons whom
he knows to be dealing with the other as agent that the other is
not his agent,""° the better basis of liability is estoppel, requiring
a change of position. The rationale behind this is derived from the
tort principle of not requiring one to act to prevent harm to another.
Seavey thus reasons it is unnecessary protection to allow recovery
without a change of position in such a case.
Few cases in West Virginia have considered the doctrines of
apparent authority and agency by estoppel. No case similar to the
principal case has been before the West Virginia Supreme Court.
In Gallagher v. Washington City Say., Loan & Bldg. Co.,3 ' the
court held, in a suit for specific performance, that a real estate
broker with authority to show land for sale was without authority
to bind the owner to the contract of sale under an apparent authority
theory. The court states that an apparent agency is an agency by
estoppel, and that "it is only such a state of facts from which one
by reasons of his representations or the holding out of another as
his agent is estopped to deny the existence of the agency, and is
bound by the acts of such persons acting within the apparent scope
of his authority."32 However, the dictum of the tort case of Brewer
v. Appalachian Constructors, Inc.33 seems to apply to the facts
of the principal case, stating that "[agency by estoppel] involves
a case in which there may be no agency in fact, but by representa-
tions upon which reliance is had, the person making those repre-
sentations is estopped to deny the relationship of principal and
agent, or, in the case of an employer, of employer and employee."3"
A recent West Virginia case, General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Fields,35
examined the state's position and cited the dictum in the Brewer
case as binding law. In the Fields case, an action on a note given
27Ibid.
28 Cases cited notes 20-24 supra.
29 SFvAY, AGENcy § 8E (1964).
30 Ibid.
31 125 W. Va. 791, 25 S.E.2d 914 (1943).
32 Id. at 800, 25 S.E.2d at 919.
33 138 W. Va. 437, 76 S.E.2d 916 (1953).34 1d. at 451, 76 S.E.2d 924 (1953).
3s 148 W. Va. 176, 133 S.E.2d 780 (1963).
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on a conditional sales contract, the court held for the defendant
stating that payments made to the dealer of the merchandise were
valid, as he was the apparent agent of the plaintiff to collect
payments on the notes. Concerning agency by estoppel, the court
stated that "one who knows that another is acting as his agent or
permitted another to appear as his agent, to the injury of third
persons who have dealt with the apparent agent as such in good
faith and in the exercise of reasonable prudence, is estopped to
deny the agency."36 In West Virginia, if the rule adopted from
the dictum in the Brewer case were applied to the principal case,
the same decision would be reached, but on the theory of estoppel
as opposed to apparent authority.
The estoppel theory of agency is readily accepted by most of
the courts. Where the fact situation presents the same problems
as in the principal case, more courts are inclined to base their
decision on agency by estoppel than apparent authority. The
principal case seems to be in the minority, in calling the basis
of their decision apparent authority, where there is no agency in
fact, but only an apparent agency. Such apparent agency is more
often recognized as being based on estoppel of the apparent
principal. The question of whether they are really one concept
treated in different contexts remains. The authorities do agree
that as a practical matter the underlying principle of both theories
is the same, i.e., that a party should be bound by what he actually
says and does, and not by any intent hidden in his mind. 7 There
seems to be no difference in the type of fact situation to which
each is applied, except that it appears that where there is no
pre-existing agency, or where the defendant is guilty of failing to
act rather than an affirmative act, the better view would be to apply
estoppel requiring the presence of the extra element of a change
in position. There is a difference in the manner of application of
the two theories. The contract theory of apparent authority gives a
mutual cause of action to the apparent principal, whereas the
estoppel theory, based on tort, gives rise to no cause of action
in the apparent principal, but merely bars him from denying the
authority given the agent under the apparent agency on which
the plaintiff relies. But, emphasizing the ultimate singleness of
36 1d. at 182, 133 S.E.2d at 783.
37 RESTATEMENT, (SEco, Q, AGENCY § 8, comment d (1958); MEHEm,
AcENcy § 89 (4th ed. 1952).
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the proposition involved-to hold the principal liable-it seems
unfortunate that it takes on different technical names in its varying
contexts. As Mechem states, "it seems unfortunate that so much
time has been spent and so much heat generated over scarcely more
than a difference in terminology .... [as] few practical conse-
quences will result from the choice of one formula rather than the
other." 8 One can be certain, though, that the debate will continue,
and, despite consistently holding the defendant liable, that the
courts will continue, in cases bearing similar facts to the principal
case, to justify and base their decisions on different and incon-
sistent terminology.
Robert Brand Stone
Constitutional Law-Bodily Intrusions as Violations
of Constitutional Rights
D attempted to smuggle packets of heroin into the United States
by swallowing the packets and carrying them into this country in his
stomach. United States Customs Agents, who were advised that
D had told the Royal Canadian Mounted Police he was using this
method of smuggling, took D to a physician's office twelve miles
from the United States - Mexico border to be examined. Following
a rectal probe which proved negative, D was given a saline solution
to drink to produce vomiting. D sipped it without objection, and
was observed throwing up an object and reswallowing it. The
doctor then suggested use of a tube procedure to recover the
object, to which D did not consent. Following D's refusal, two
agents held his arms, one his head, and the tube procedure, in
which the tube goes through the nose to the stomach and saline
solution is then passed through the tube to produce vomiting, was
used. It resulted in D expelling two capsules of heroin. D was
convicted of smuggling narcotics into the United States and
appealed. Held, affirmed. It was not a violation of D's constitu-
tional rights to have this tube procedure, sometimes termed
"stomach pumping," used to procure the evidence. Blefare v. United
States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
38 McEm, AGENCY § 90 (4th ed. 1952).
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